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The ‘16+1’ formula of cooperation between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and China was launched in 2012. One of its priorities involved increasing the inflow of 
China’s foreign direct investments (FDI) to the region. China has been interested in carrying 
out investments which are likely to help Chinese companies gain competitive advantage in 
areas such as advanced technologies, recognizable brands and distribution channels. The fol-
lowing sectors were identified as areas of priority importance in CEE: construction and mo-
dernisation of transport infrastructure, including motorways; development of the network of 
railways, airports and sea ports; energy, in particular renewable sources of energy and nuc-
lear energy; companies trading in commodities; the food production sector. China’s strategy 
mainly involves purchasing existing companies, preceded by cherry picking the most favoura-
ble candidates for investment, rather than making large greenfield investments. 
Due to the involvement of the state in the process of locating investments abroad, which is typ-
ical of the Chinese economic model, stable bilateral relations with CEE partners have become 
key determinants for achieving these goals. In this context, the stabilisation of China’s political 
relations with CEE observed in 2011–2014 can be viewed as a success on China’s part. However, 
the process of creating multilateral institutions to offer substantive and financial support to 
Chinese companies was beset with difficulties. These included the lack of willingness on the 
part of CEE partners to carry out coordination tasks, the inexperience of Chinese companies in 
pursuing this model of cooperation, as well as failure to adjust the instruments created under 
this cooperation initiative to the region’s economic reality. The credit line worth US$ 10 billion 
offered by China has been used only in infrastructural projects carried out in non-EU member 
states in the Western Balkans. A specialised investment fund known as China CEE Investment 
Co-operation Fund turned out to be more successful. However, investments carried out under 
this Fund in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria are worth a mere US$ 0.5 billion. It can be expected 
that China will seek other models of financing its investments in the region and will use such 
instruments as the Silk Road Fund or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
China’s investment strategy in CEE
The creation of instruments to provide financial 
and substantive support to companies operat-
ing in foreign markets is typical of the Chinese 
foreign investment strategy. The state inter-
venes in the process of locating China’s foreign 
direct investments at several levels – the stra-
tegic level, the regulatory level and by creating 
support mechanisms. Since 2000, which was 
when the Go Out strategy was implemented, 
initiating the era of Chinese capital expansion, 
China’s government has been identifying priori-
ty goals of foreign investments in line with long-
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term development goals set out for the Chinese 
economy. Investments carried out in sectors 
indicated by specific government agencies are 
facilitated by various means of institutional and 
financial support – dedicated funds and credit 
lines are launched via state-owned banks1 to 
offer funding on preferential terms. Companies 
are invited to apply for subsidies to support 
their operations, for reimbursement of initial 
costs of investments and for advisory services. 
Most often these instruments are devised as 
a result of political agreements with states 
which are the recipients of these investments. 
At present, China’s government gradually aban-
doning its administrative control over the pro-
cess of locating foreign investments that has 
been applied so far, and is moving towards 
shaping investments by creating financial and 
institutional incentives. All investments whose 
value exceeds the limit2 set under an adminis-
trative procedure still need prior approval by the 
Ministry of Trade, the National Council for De-
velopment and Reforms or the State Council of 
the People’s Republic of China. The importance 
of political relations has also been boosted by 
the fact that a major portion of China’s FDI is 
being carried out by state-owned enterprises. 
Good relations with the state which is the re-
cipient of specific investment reduce the risk of 
making the transaction political in nature. To 
1 The investments are most frequently supported by Chi-
na’s four largest state-owned banks: China Exim Bank, 
Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
and Agricultural Bank of China.
2 The limit depends on the specific sector and on wheth-
er the investor company is a centrally managed state-
owned company. Generally, all investments worth more 
than US$ 10 million require approval by a relevant body.
some extent, they can also influence the course 
of negotiations, as certain agreements can be 
reached at inter-governmental level. 
The goals of China’s direct investments in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe should be viewed in 
a wider context of development goals identified 
in the 12th Five-Year Plan for the years 2011–2015. 
The Plan mentions the need to acquire strate-
gic assets to enable Chinese companies to in-
crease their competitiveness on global markets, 
including by acquiring foreign companies to 
guarantee Chinese companies access to tech-
nology and an R&D base, to international sales 
channels and to recognizable brands. The task 
of securing the supplies of raw materials to the 
Chinese economy is being carried out by invest-
ing in the exploration of natural resources and 
in the production of foodstuffs. Another goal 
set for Chinese companies in the Five-Year Plan 
involves investments in foreign infrastructural 
projects, as well as offering preferential loans 
for projects carried out by Chinese contractors. 
This has been an element of a wider strategy of 
international development of Chinese engineer-
ing companies. The aim of this strategy element 
is to acquire foreign experience, to reduce the 
surplus in the supply of Chinese building mate-
rials and to foster the export of Chinese-made 
technologies, in particular in the sectors of high-
speed rail and of nuclear power plants.
A detailed catalogue of sectors considered top 
priority3, published by the Chinese Ministry of 
Trade in 2011, at the very beginning of the Chi-
nese diplomatic offensive in the region, offers 
an insight into China’s investment strategy in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The catalogue con-
tains pieces of advice and recommendations 
for Chinese investors operating in 12 out of 
the 16 CEE states4. The emphasis is placed on 
sectors such as construction and modernisa-
3 MOFCOM, Duiwaitouziguobiechanyezhiyin (2011 ban), 
hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201109/1315379855245.pdf
4 Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia and Montenegro have not 
been included in the document. 
China’s investment strategy in Central 
and Eastern Europe has been closely 
linked to the implementation of the 12th 
Five-Year Plan.
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tion of transport infrastructure, of motorways, 
and development of the network of railways, 
airports and sea ports. Another important area 
of infrastructure investments is the energy sec-
tor, in particular renewable sources of energy 
and nuclear energy. The priority sectors recom-
mended by the Chinese government as foreign 
direct investment targets are different for spe-
cific CEE states. In the case of less developed 
economies, mainly the Western Balkan states, 
transactions involving the mining industry, the 
wood processing industry and the production 
of foodstuffs were recommended. Companies 
trading in commodities, which are frequently 
state-owned, were indicated as prospective ob-
jects of acquisition under privatisation projects 
also in other countries, including in Poland. In 
more developed economies, such as Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic, the investment 
recommendations involved the sectors of ad-
vanced technologies, IT, automotive industry, 
electronics, biotechnology, nanotechnology, 
the precision industry, R&D centres. In several 
of the region’s states, the sectors of advanced 
services and software development as well as 
tourism have been identified as the key sectors.
The selection of sectors in specific CEE states 
has largely reflected the region’s potential as 
an area in which China’s goals defined in the 
12th Five-Year Plan can be pursued. The focus 
on infrastructural cooperation, which is one of 
the priorities, is connected with the problem 
of backward and insufficiently developed in-
frastructure in CEE countries, as seen from Bei-
jing’s perspective. This problem has been em-
phasised by China. The importance of this area 
has also been boosted by the launch of the New 
Silk Road project – the development of trans-
port infrastructure in the region has become 
a key issue in the context of the construction 
of an overland connection between China and 
the European Union. The remaining areas from 
the list of those recommended suggest that the 
Chinese side is interested in investments which 
could help Chinese companies gain competitive 
advantage. These investments involve technol-
ogies and distribution channels. What is inter-
esting is that relatively competitive sectors have 
been selected for specific states. These include 
the production of lasers in Lithuania, advanced 
automotive industry in the Czech Republic, bio-
technology and the aviation sector in Poland. 
China’s strategy mainly involves purchasing ex-
isting companies, which is preceded by cherry 
picking the most favourable candidates for in-
vestment. Less attention is being paid to large 
greenfield investments5. Documents published 
by China indicate that the effectiveness-based 
model of investments, i.e. transferring produc-
tion to another location in order to optimise 
costs, has been much less popular with Chinese 
entrepreneurs than with businesses from devel-
oped countries carrying out investments in CEE. 
The institutionalisation of contacts – 
new platforms of economic cooperation
The development of the ‘16+1’ format in the 
years 2011–2014 largely reflected China’s stra-
tegic aims defined at the beginning of the dip-
lomatic offensive in the region. However, China 
encountered numerous barriers. These included 
a low level of motivation for coordinating tasks 
and a preference for bilateral solutions on the 
part of CEE states, the problems with adjusting 
the Chinese investment model to EU regula-
tions and the criticism voiced by some Western 
5 This is in line with the wider context of China’s invest-
ments in the European Union – according to data com-
piled for 2014, mergers and acquisitions accounted for 
86% of the value of China’s investments in the EU.
The government has identified companies 
which have advanced technologies and 
well-developed distribution channels as 
a priority for direct investments.
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European states towards the new multilateral 
initiative that China pursues in CEE. All this has 
influenced the shape of institutions which were 
created in recent years to support China’s in-
vestments and infrastructural projects in CEE 
markets. It has also limited their usefulness. 
Several important cooperation areas (from Bei-
jing’s perspective) have remained unexplored. 
The three most significant axes of cooperation 
development in the years 2011–2014 were: co-
operation between government agencies which 
offer business support, advancing the relations 
in the field of infrastructure and devising instru-
ments of funding.
One of the main challenges faced by the gov-
ernments of the ‘16+1’ states involved providing 
substantive support and information on invest-
ment regulations to Chinese investors and their 
local business partners, as well as creating plat-
forms for making business contacts. To achieve 
this, in 2014 two multilateral institutions were 
created under the ‘16+1’ format to group busi-
ness support agencies. The China-CEEC Busi-
ness Council, coordinated by the Polish Agency 
for Enterprise Development, groups institutions 
from 13 states of the region and from China. 
Its tasks include the promotion of investment, 
trade and technological cooperation. A more 
specialised platform, the China-CEEC Invest-
ment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism 
was created in November 2014. It has been co-
ordinated by the Polish Information and Foreign 
Investment Agency. It groups all 16 states of the 
region and deals with the exchange of informa-
tion regarding investments, the organisation 
of training events, seminars and conferences 
attended by prospective investors. The biggest 
limitation in this type of cooperation is the low 
level of motivation for task coordination. CEE 
states have competed for direct investments 
from developed countries for years. Frequent-
ly, they have done so using the same govern-
ment agencies which have been grouped under 
the ‘16+1’ format. This is why a large portion 
of events and instruments targeted at Chinese 
investors is being created on the basis of bilat-
eral relations which have been revived recently. 
Even though this can be viewed as fulfilment of 
some of the goals defined by China, it offers no 
guarantee of success for the actions China has 
been pursuing across the entire region.
In 2011–2014, multilateral cooperation in the 
field of infrastructure in the entire region was 
limited to joint declarations announced during 
annual meetings of the leaders of the ‘16+1’ 
states. Strategic priorities under ‘16+1’ includ-
ed the creation of a railway transport corridor 
from Europe to China, the support for joint 
projects focused on transport infrastructure, 
as well as cooperation in simplifying customs 
procedures and in building transport hubs. In 
later years, the putative framework of multilat-
eral cooperation with CEE was augmented with 
‘content’ related to the New Silk Road initiative. 
The signing in December 2014 of an agreement 
between China, Hungary and Serbia, involv-
ing the modernisation of a railway connection 
linking Belgrade with Budapest, suggests that 
the ‘16+1’ cooperation formula can be a useful 
tool for China to coordinate cross-border infra-
structural projects in the CEE region. However, 
so far no agreement has been reached in the 
negotiations on the prospective creation of an 
institution focused on the issue of infrastruc-
ture which would group all states of the region. 
The absence of such an agreement seems all the 
more striking considering the fact that the in-
tention had been declared during the summits 
in 2013 and 2014. Similarly, the stated forma-
The development of the ‘16+1’ formula 
in 2011–2014 reflected China’s strategic 
aims defined earlier.
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tion of another institution of this type to deal 
with energy issues6, has also ended in a fiasco. 
Cooperation in the field of energy infrastructure 
has mainly been pursued at bilateral level – Chi-
na has signed framework agreements regarding 
cooperation in the field of nuclear energy with 
Romania and the Czech Republic; it has also 
signed a similar memorandum with Hungary.
The creation of funding mechanisms
The establishment of funding mechanisms, 
which is of key importance from the point of 
view of the Chinese model of supporting out-
ward foreign direct investments and infrastruc-
tural projects, encountered a relatively large 
number of difficulties during the process of 
developing China’s cooperation with the CEE 
states. When the ‘16+1’ formula was launched 
by China’s then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in 
Warsaw in 2012, China announced the creation 
of a special credit line worth US$ 10 billion to 
be used for investments in infrastructure, mod-
ern technologies and the green economy. The 
launch of this special credit line, which original-
ly was to include state guarantees of the loans 
extended under it, was initially confronted with 
legal barriers in the form of EU regulations. As a 
consequence, the launch was delayed. It turned 
out later that businesses from the CEE region 
were only marginally interested in this method 
of funding – companies and public institutions 
from EU states had access to more attractive 
forms of funding, including EU structural funds. 
As a consequence, in 2011–2014 the credit line 
made available by China was used only in infra-
structural projects carried out in non-EU mem-
ber states in the Western Balkans. Examples 
included the construction of the Bar-Boljare 
motorway in Montenegro, of the Mihajlo Pupin 
6 According to the documents published after the Bel-
grade summit, coordination of an institution respon-
sible for infrastructure was to be entrusted to Serbia, 
while coordination of energy-related matters was to be 
entrusted to Romania.
Bridge in Belgrade and of the Stanari thermal 
power plant in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
geographical coverage of this means of fund-
ing was largely limited, which prevented China 
from pursuing all its goals set for the region.
The weakness of the multilateral credit instru-
ment created under the ‘16+1’ formula has 
boosted the role of funding offered in a bi-
lateral formula. In recent years, China’s larg-
est state-owned banks have opened foreign 
branches in Poland and in Hungary. By the end 
of 2015, the Bank of China plans to open its 
branch in the Czech Republic. China Exim Bank 
has signed several agreements regarding the 
support for investments to be offered joint-
ly with local banks which implement govern-
ment policy in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. 
Another mechanism of funding proposed in 
2012 by the then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, 
a specialised investment fund operating un-
der the name China CEE Investment Co-opera-
tion Fund, has turned out to be more success-
ful. The initial amount at its disposal was US$ 
500 million, offered to it by China Exim Bank 
and by institutional investors from Poland and 
from Hungary. In Poland, the fund successful-
ly launched investments involving wind farms 
(projects Wróblew and Zopowy) and telecom-
munications (ECS SA). In Hungary, it invested in 
the education sector (the private university BKF 
University), and in Bulgaria – in the production 
of sports equipment (Walltopia). In December 
2014, Exim Bank announced that a further US$ 
1 billion will be made available to the fund. 
From the point of view of China’s strategy, the 
fund has managed to meet some of its initial 
China encountered major obstacles in 
creating an investment funding mech-
anism which would be attractive for the 
region and adapted to EU requirements.
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goals, e.g. it contributed to a diversification of 
China’s currency reserves. However, it has failed 
to ensure the involvement of Chinese companies 
in the implementation of projects within CEE. 
Successful operation of financial institutions of 
this type, which pursue an alternative model to 
the model of traditional credit lines offered by 
the government, is likely to encourage China to 
seek new methods of carrying out investments 
in the CEE region. During his visit to Belgrade 
in 2014, China’s Prime Minister Li Keqiang an-
nounced that his country would be open to 
“new models of funding and investments” and 
that a new fund worth US$ 3 billion would be 
established that will explore new ways of coop-
eration through public-private partnerships. So 
far, these plans have not materialised.
The potential for development 
of investment cooperation
From the point of view of China’s strategy to 
increase the scale of foreign direct investments 
in CEE, the biggest success of the ‘16+1’ coop-
eration formula involves the strengthening of 
bilateral relations with the partners in the re-
gion. CEE states have boosted their efforts to 
attract Chinese investors, offering them sub-
stantive, legal and political support. In this way, 
the goals defined by China have largely been 
attained, although Beijing has failed to obtain 
a positive result regarding multilateral activities 
carried out across the region. Further develop-
ment of multilateral economic cooperation in-
stitutions under the ‘16+1’ formula will necessi-
tate addressing the problem of competing for 
Chinese investments. This can be achieved, for 
example, by focusing on cross-border projects 
under the New Silk Road initiative.
The progress in the creation of China’s mecha-
nisms for financing of investments, combined 
with announcements by Prime Minister Li 
Keqiang during the ‘16+1’ summit in Belgrade, 
suggest that China will be seeking new mod-
els to finance investments which would offer 
an alternative to the insufficiently used credit 
line. Funding instruments to be used outside 
of CEE, which are currently being devised by 
China, may serve to boost investments. Since it 
is located near the proposed land route of the 
New Silk Road, the region is entitled to use the 
funds available from the Silk Road Fund worth 
US$ 40 billion. Another source of funding could 
be the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, an 
investment bank which might be interested in 
investments located outside Asia that would be 
likely to stimulate Asia’s growth. 
Due to the fact that 12 out of 16 European states 
grouped in the ‘16+1’ cooperation formula are 
EU members, the dynamics of China’s direct and 
infrastructural investments in CEE also depends 
on the state of EU-China relations. At a politi-
cal level, criticism regarding the ‘16+1’ formula, 
repeatedly voiced by some Western European 
states, may impede the development of cooper-
ation. The signing of a bilateral investment trea-
ty (BIT) between China and the EU could be an 
important stimulus for Chinese investments in 
the region. In most cases, bilateral agreements 
between individual CEE states and China were 
signed more than 20 years ago and they are no 
longer appropriate for the current economic 
situation. From the point of view of the imple-
mentation of infrastructural projects, greater 
synchronisation of China’s investment strategies 
in the CEE region with EU development and in-
The shape of China’s investments in the 
region will depend on the development 
of the New Silk Road project, on the 
development of China-EU relations and 
on the strategic goals defined in the 13th 
Five-Year Plan.
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vestment policies could be favourable to China7.
However, the area of the real economy and the 
changes to the Chinese economic model, cur-
rently being implemented, continue to be issues 
of key importance for the inflow of China’s FDI 
to CEE states. The main challenges for the ‘16+1’ 
governments involve insufficient experience in 
business cooperation between China and CEE, 
limited knowledge of regulatory requirements 
and business practice among Chinese compa-
nies, and insufficient number of investment 
project proposals authored by CEE companies 
and presented to Chinese investors. Moreover, 
7 It is worth mentioning that the documents published af-
ter the meetings held in Bucharest and in Belgrade con-
tained explicit declarations regarding the coherence of 
infrastructural cooperation between CEE and China with 
EU regulations, EU infrastructural projects and a wid-
er agenda of cooperation between the EU and China. 
This introduces a pan-European dimension to the ‘16+1’ 
cooperation formula; moreover, it is a consequence of 
strong opposition from Western European states which 
had initially been excluded from the project.
Chinese outward FDI flows are limited by struc-
tural factors – the number of CEE companies 
with proper technology, distribution channels 
and recognizable brands is relatively small. 
Considering the involvement of the Chinese 
state in locating China’s foreign investments, in 
upcoming years the directions of these invest-
ments are likely to be shaped by new priorities 
governing China’s investment strategy. These 
are contained in the 13th Five-Year Plan for the 
years 2016–2020 which is currently being de-
vised. A similar role will be played by the devel-
opment of the New Silk Road project.
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The size of China’s foreign direct investments in Central and Eastern Europe
Measurements of the flow of China’s foreign direct investments are severely hampered by the signi-
ficant involvement of offshore financial centres in these type of transactions, by cases of by-passing 
administrative restrictions imposed on capital flows using unofficial channels, and by deficiencies in 
statistical methodologies used. This results in a distortion of the officially published data and in con-
siderable underestimation of the value of direct investments – this is the case for both Chinese and 
European sources. The data presented below has been published by the Chinese National Statistical 
Office and offers an insight into main trends regarding China’s direct investments in Central and 
Eastern Europe. It should, however, be read taking account of the context described above.
China’s accumulated foreign direct investments in CEE, 2007-2014, in US$ million
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Czech Republic 19.64 32.43 49.34 52.33 66.83 202.45 204.68 242.69
Estonia 1.26 1.26 7.50 7.50 7.50 3.50 3.50 3.50
Hungary 78.17 88.75 97.41 465.70 475.35 507.41 532.35 556.35
Poland 98.93 109.93 120.30 140.31 201.26 208.11 257.04 329.35
Slovakia 5.10 5.10 9.36 9.82 25.78 86.01 82.77 127.79
Slovenia 1.40 1.40 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Albania 0.51 0.51 4.35 4.43 4.43 4.43 7.03 7.03
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 3.51 3.51 5.92 5.98 6.01 6.07 6.13 6.13
Bulgaria 4.74 4.74 2.31 18.60 72.56 126.74 149.85 170.27
Croatia 7.84 7.84 8.10 8.13 8.18 8.63 8.31 11.87
Macedonia 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.26 2.09 2.11
Latvia 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
Lithuania 3.93 3.93 3.93 3.93 3.93 6.97 12.48 12.48
Montenegro 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
Romania 72.88 85.66 93.34 124.95 125.83 161.09 145.13 191.37
Serbia 2.00 2.00 2.68 4.84 5.05 6.47 18.54 29.71
Total 301.00 348.15 410.60 852.58 1008.77 1334.00 1435.76 1696.51
Źródło: MOFCOM, SAFE, NBS, 2015
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